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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeiland, Torstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:42Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25649-
dc.description.abstractIn a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2007,048en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordCheap talk communicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordReal-time protocolen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwInformationen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleCheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn547461550en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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