Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25640
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dc.contributor.authorFreytag, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Friedrich G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:35Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25640-
dc.description.abstractCentral bank independence (CBI) is a very important precondition for price stability. However, the empirical evidence for a correlation between both is relatively weak. In this paper, this weakness is countered with a) an extended measure of monetary commitment, which includes well-known criteria for CBI and external criteria such as convertibility and exchange rate regimes and b) the argument that monetary commitment can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment with data from four decades confirms the crucial role of monetary commitment for price stability.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2007,002en_US
dc.subject.jelE50en_US
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordprice stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary commitmenten_US
dc.subject.stwPreisniveaustabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen_US
dc.titleMonetary commitment, institutional constraints and inflation: empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1970sen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn547198434en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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