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dc.contributor.authorGehrig, Thomas P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorLevínský, Renéen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25634-
dc.description.abstractIn a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. These idiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider’s inclination to acquire information. True demand expectations are not evolutionarily stable when beliefs, via revelation, can be used to commit to more aggressive behavior. The commitment effect fades away in large markets and has the same direction for both strategic substitutes and complements. Whether one observes an insider, in the long run, depends on information costs. For strategic substitutes insider activity benefits the whole population whereas the uninformed sellers could gain even more than the insider.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2007,068en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.keywordco-evolution of idiosyncratic beliefsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinside informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneous marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwInsiderhandelen_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsaustauschen_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the co-evolution of insider information and idiosyncratic beliefsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn54718767Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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