Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25634 
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dc.contributor.authorGehrig, Thomas P.en
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorLevínský, Renéen
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25634-
dc.description.abstractIn a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. These idiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider’s inclination to acquire information. True demand expectations are not evolutionarily stable when beliefs, via revelation, can be used to commit to more aggressive behavior. The commitment effect fades away in large markets and has the same direction for both strategic substitutes and complements. Whether one observes an insider, in the long run, depends on information costs. For strategic substitutes insider activity benefits the whole population whereas the uninformed sellers could gain even more than the insider.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,068en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordco-evolution of idiosyncratic beliefsen
dc.subject.keywordinside informationen
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneous marketsen
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwInsiderhandelen
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwInformationsaustauschen
dc.subject.stwEvolutionsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the co-evolution of insider information and idiosyncratic beliefs-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn54718767Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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