Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25633
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dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25633-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between effciency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual `value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. Overall, our results indicate that fairness (or inequality aversion) is more in°uential than efficiency in driving behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2007,067en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordConditional cooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordFairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordEffciencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordValue orientationsen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.titleAre cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded?: evidence from a public goods experimenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn54718719Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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