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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25633
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Levati, Maria Vittoria | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ploner, Matteo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-27T09:39:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-27T09:39:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25633 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between effciency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual `value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. Overall, our results indicate that fairness (or inequality aversion) is more in°uential than efficiency in driving behavior. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,067 | en |
dc.subject.jel | A13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Public goods experiments | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Conditional cooperation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Fairness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Effciency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Value orientations | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | en |
dc.title | Are cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded?: evidence from a public goods experiment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 54718719X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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