Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25607
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dc.contributor.authorEllingsen, Toreen_US
dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:21:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:21:10Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25607-
dc.description.abstractCan two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy equilibria, one party gets all the surplus. Even though we impose no constraints on side-payments, efficient compromises are unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conflict.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2007,037en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordDisagreementen_US
dc.subject.keywordTransaction Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDisagreement and authorityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn547124554en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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