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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:21:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:21:05Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25601-
dc.description.abstractCan one define and test the hypothesis of (un)bounded rationality in stochastic choice tasks without endorsing Bayesianism? Similar to the state specificity of assets, we rely on state-specific goal formation. In a given choice task, the list of state-specific goal levels is optimal if one cannot increase the goal level for one state without having to decrease that for other states. We show that this allows to relate optimality more easily to bounded rationality where we interpret goal levels as aspirations. If for the latter there exist choices satisfying all state-specific aspirations and if one such choice is used, we speak of satisficing which may or may not be optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2007,035en_US
dc.subject.jelB4en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD10en_US
dc.subject.keywordSatisficingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimalityen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwStatistischer Testen_US
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwKontingenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationalityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn547112270en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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