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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25539
  
Title:The economic impact of merger control legislation PDF Logo
Authors:Carletti, Elena
Hartmann, Philipp
Onega, Steven
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:CFS Working Paper 2008/04
Abstract:Based on a unique dataset of legislative changes in industrial countries, we identify events that strengthen the competition control of mergers and acquisitions, analyze their impact on banks and non-financial firms and explain the different reactions observed with specific regulatory characteristics of the banking sector. Covering nineteen countries for the period 1987 to 2004, we find that more competition-oriented merger control increases the stock prices of banks and decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms. Bank targets become more profitable and larger, while those of non-financial firms remain mostly unaffected. A major determinant of the positive bank returns is the degree of opaqueness that characterizes the institutional setup for supervisory bank merger reviews. The legal design of the supervisory control of bank mergers may therefore have important implications for real activity.
Subjects:Mergers and Acquisitions
Competition Policy
Legal Institutions
Financial Regulation
JEL:G21
G28
D4
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-53217
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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