Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25513
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dc.contributor.authorWoodford, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-24T13:48:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-24T13:48:19Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-38229-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25513-
dc.description.abstractThe paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely modelconsistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more historydependent than if rational expectations are assumed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGoethe University, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2007/12en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Monetary Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordHistory-Dependent Policyen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRationale Erwartungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRobustly optimal monetary policy with near-rational expectationsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn527629359en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200712-

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