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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25478
  
Title:Why do contracts differ between VC types? Market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties PDF Logo
Authors:Hirsch, Julia
Walz, Uwe
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:CFS Working Paper 2006/12
Abstract:The main objective of the present paper is to disentangle observed differences in the design of contracts across VC types into firm selection effects and corporate governance differences between VC types (different contracts). Based on a theoretical approach developed in the first part of the paper, we investigate in the second part these issues empirically by using a unique, hand-collected German data set consisting of all contractual details of VC investments into 290 entrepreneurial firms in the period 1990-2004. By employing various matching procedures, we show that VC types differ in both firm choice and corporate governance approach.
Subjects:Venture Capital
Corporate Governance
Matching
Contract Design
JEL:G24
G32
G34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-27711
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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