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dc.contributor.authorAllen, Franklinen_US
dc.contributor.authorCarletti, Elenaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarquez, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-24T13:47:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-24T13:47:13Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-18130-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25422-
dc.description.abstractMarket discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for Financial Studies Frankfurt, Mainen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFS Working Paper 2005/23en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBankingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCostly Capitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsset Side Market Disciplineen_US
dc.subject.stwKreditmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwEigenkapitalvorschriftenen_US
dc.subject.stwEinlagensicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCredit market competition and capital regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn504023489en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200523-
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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