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Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25385
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| Title: | | The credibility of central bank announcements  |
| Authors: | | Hoeberichts, Marco |
| Issue Date: | | 2002 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CFS Working Paper 2002/09 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation. |
| Subjects: | | monetary policy private information announcements |
| JEL: | | E52 E58 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.
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