Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25275
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dc.contributor.authorBlock, Jörn Hendrichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T15:03:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T15:03:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25275-
dc.description.abstractThe relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is higher with family-member CEOs than it is with nonfamily member CEOs. Furthermore, family-member CEOs receive a lower share of option pay. The paper's findings have implications for family business research and the executive compensation literature. To make the findings robust, the statistical analysis is performed with both Bayesian and classical frequentist methods.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2008,033en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExecutive compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily firmsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstock optionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordagency theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordBayesian analysisen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienunternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwAktienoptionsplanen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleAre CEOs in family firms paid like bureaucrats?: evidence from Bayesian and frequentist analysesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn571729436en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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