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Title:Are CEOs in family firms paid like bureaucrats?: evidence from Bayesian and frequentist analyses PDF Logo
Authors:Block, Jörn Hendrich
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:SFB 649 discussion paper 2008,033
Abstract:The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is higher with family-member CEOs than it is with nonfamily member CEOs. Furthermore, family-member CEOs receive a lower share of option pay. The paper's findings have implications for family business research and the executive compensation literature. To make the findings robust, the statistical analysis is performed with both Bayesian and classical frequentist methods.
Subjects:Executive compensation
family firms
stock options
agency theory
Bayesian analysis
JEL:G30
J30
M52
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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