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dc.contributor.authorBoeri, Titoen_US
dc.contributor.authorBurda, Michael C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T15:03:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T15:03:41Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25263-
dc.description.abstractStandard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision represented by employment protection (a firing tax) is necessary for such preferences to emerge. Endogenizing collective bargaining can significantly modify comparative statics effects of policy arising in a single-regime setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSFB 649, Economic Risk Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSFB 649 discussion paper 2008,021en_US
dc.subject.jelJ5en_US
dc.subject.jelJ6en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordWage rigidityen_US
dc.subject.keywordemployment protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium unemploymenten_US
dc.subject.stwTarifpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnrigiditäten_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePreferences for collective versus individualised wage settingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559086466en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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