Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25227
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dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulfen_US
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T15:03:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T15:03:16Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25227-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms that are characterized by large managerial discretion of the CEO. The abnormal returns we document are one potential explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully reflected in prices but leads to abnormal returns.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2007,055en_US
dc.subject.jelG12en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCEO-Ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsset Pricing with large shareholdersen_US
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieranalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleWhy managers hold shares of their firms: an empirical analysisen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558614817en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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