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Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Grimm, Oliver | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ried, Stefan | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-02-19 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-23T14:44:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-23T14:44:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | SFB 649, Economic Risk Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2007,028 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E61 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | monetary union | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | heterogeneities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | policy game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | simultaneous policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | sequential policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | coordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | discretionary policies | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Währungsunion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Finanzpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Geldpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Macroeconomic policy in a heterogeneous Monetary Union | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 558548563 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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