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dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorRied, Stefanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:44:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:44:47Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25200-
dc.description.abstractWe use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSFB 649, Economic Risk Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSFB 649 discussion paper 2007,028en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelF42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordsimultaneous policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscretionary policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleMacroeconomic policy in a heterogeneous Monetary Unionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558548563en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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