Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25185
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dc.contributor.authorBethmann, Dirken_US
dc.contributor.authorKvasnicka, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:44:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:44:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25185-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a first microeconomic foundation for the institution of marriage. Based on a model of reproduction, mating, and parental investment in children, we argue that marriage serves the purpose of attenuating the risk of mating market failure that arises from incomplete information on individual paternity. Raising the costs of mating to individuals, marriage circumscribes female infidelity and mate poaching among men, which reduces average levels of paternal uncertainty in society. A direct gain in male utility, the latter induces men to invest more in their putative offspring, a fact that benefits women because of the public good nature of children. Able to realize Pareto improvements, marriage as an institution is hence explained as the result of a societal consensus on the need to organize and structure mating behavior and reproduction in society for the benefit of paternal certainty and biparental investment in offspring.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2007,013en_US
dc.subject.jelD10en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ13en_US
dc.subject.jelD02en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMarriageen_US
dc.subject.keywordMatingen_US
dc.subject.keywordPaternal Uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordParental Investmenten_US
dc.subject.stwEheen_US
dc.subject.stwMikroökonomische Fundierungen_US
dc.subject.stwElternen_US
dc.subject.stwKinderen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleUncertain paternity, mating market failure, and the institution of marriageen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558531156en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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