Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25168
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dc.contributor.authorKragl, Jennyen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, Juliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:44:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:44:24Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25168-
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2006,085en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agenten_US
dc.subject.keywordrelational contracten_US
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvyen_US
dc.titleRelational contracts and inequity aversionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn522570267en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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