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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2006,085
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents.
Schlagwörter: 
principal-agent
relational contract
inequity aversion
envy
JEL: 
D63
D82
M52
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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