Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25129
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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFabel, Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:57Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25129-
dc.description.abstractThe current study investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an innovator supplying an intellectual asset, a professional assigned to productive tasks, and a consulting firm specializing in matching ideas and professional skills. A rather simple pure tripartite partnership implements the consultant's expected profit maximum and maximizes the project's expected surplus. The liquidity-constrained professional is compensated by receiving a share of one half in the new venture. The consultant's and the innovator's shares reflect the relative value of search. However, the consultant's optimal search effort to find an appropriate production partner is inefficiently low.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2006,047en_US
dc.subject.jelM13en_US
dc.subject.jelM21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnew venturesen_US
dc.subject.keywordtripartite incentive contracten_US
dc.subject.keywordconsulting contracten_US
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensgründungen_US
dc.titleThe division of ownership in new venturesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn518430960en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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