Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25096
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dc.contributor.authorRobe, Michel A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSteiger, Eva-Mariaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMichel, Pierre-Armanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:34Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25096-
dc.description.abstractA popular view of limited liability in financial contracting is that it is the result of societal preferences agnainst excessive penalties. the view of most financial economists is instead that limited liability emerged as an optimal institution when, in the absence of a clear limit on economic agents liability, the development of some economic activities might have been thwarted, Viewing the institution from the perspective of optimal legal system design allows us to better understand the current debate on it. We present a broad history of penalties in financial contracts to highlight the interactions between technology, legal environments, purpose of the financial relationship, and contractual provisions. We show that harsh monetary and non-pecuniary penalties are not mere relics from a bygone era and, at the same time, that limited liability is far from a recent institution. We then discuss trade-offs associated with legal mandates of either unlimited or limited liability, both for the contractin parties and for the rest of Society. We identify two broad patterns. First, the toughness of liability rules and bankruptcy laws decreases as exogenous sources of uncertainty become relatively more important, and increases with the opportunity for moral hazard (related to diligence, risk taking, or deception).Second, bankruptcy laws become more lenient as the scope for labor specialization and the returns to human capital or entrepreneuship increase.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2006,013en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordLimited Liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordBankruptcyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDebt Bondageen_US
dc.subject.keywordDebtor's Prisonen_US
dc.subject.keywordHistoryen_US
dc.titlePenalties and optimality in financial contracts: taking stocken_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn512465541en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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