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Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schöttner, Anja | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2006-05-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-23T14:43:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-23T14:43:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | SFB 649, Economic Risk Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,052 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | job design | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | multi-tasking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | relational contracts | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Relational contracts and job design | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 512449732 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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