EconStor >
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.en_US
dc.publisherSFB 649, Economic Risk Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSFB 649 discussion paper 2005,052en_US
dc.subject.keywordjob designen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen_US
dc.titleRelational contracts and job designen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
512449732.PDF491.64 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.