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Title:Relational contracts and job design PDF Logo
Authors:Schöttner, Anja
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,052
Abstract:This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
Subjects:job design
multi-tasking
relational contracts
JEL:M51
M54
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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