|
EconStor >
Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071
|
| | |
| Title: | | Relational contracts and job design  |
| Authors: | | Schöttner, Anja |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,052 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent. |
| Subjects: | | job design multi-tasking relational contracts |
| JEL: | | M51 M54 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|