Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071
Authors: 
Schöttner, Anja
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,052
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
Subjects: 
job design
multi-tasking
relational contracts
JEL: 
M51
M54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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