Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050
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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-10-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:43:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:43:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2005,041en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelH57en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinnovation contesten_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten_US
dc.subject.keywordqualityen_US
dc.titleFixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contestsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn501723919en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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