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Title:Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests PDF Logo
Authors:Schöttner, Anja
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,041
Abstract:This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.
Subjects:innovation contest
auction
tournament
quality
JEL:D44
H57
L15
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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