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Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050
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| Title: | | Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests  |
| Authors: | | Schöttner, Anja |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,041 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors. |
| Subjects: | | innovation contest auction tournament quality |
| JEL: | | D44 H57 L15 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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