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dc.contributor.authorTykvová, Terezaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T15:12:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T15:12:40Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24815-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the venture capitalist's decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist's participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the true value of the firm.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 03-12en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordVenture Capitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordIPOen_US
dc.subject.keywordLock-upen_US
dc.subject.keywordTimingen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikokapitalen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Investitionspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Terminplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwLiquidationen_US
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe Decision of Venture Capitalists on Timing and Extent of IPOsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn364592478en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:957-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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