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dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorLange, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T15:12:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T15:12:37Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24811-
dc.description.abstractTo meet its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans to implement an emissions trading system with grandfathering of allowances. Besides having distributional impacts, the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions. In this paper, we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two-period model. We find that for (small) open trading systems, where allowance prices are exogenous, first-best second-period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions in the first period. Second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output. However, of closed emissions trading systems, i.e. endogeneous allowance prices, first- and second-best rules coincide and must not depend on previous output levels. They consist of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm-specific decisions in either of the two periods.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 03-08en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrandfatheringen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltzertifikaten_US
dc.subject.stwIndustriepolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwgrandfathering provisionen_US
dc.titleOn the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowancesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn362146322en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:909-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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