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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24747
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kalb, Alexander | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-02-16T15:10:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-02-16T15:10:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24747 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we use a simple bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion to analyze the impact of intergovernmental grants on the cost efficiency of local jurisdictions. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalization or an increase in the amount of grants received by a local jurisdiction leads to an extension of organizational slack or X-inefficiency in that jurisdiction. This theoretical prediction is tested by conducting an empirical analysis using a broad panel of German municipalities. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical findings and therefore support the existence of a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on local authorities' cost efficiency. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheim | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | ZEW Discussion Papers 08-051 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Cost efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Fiscal equalisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Intergovernmental grants | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Bureaucracy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Stochastic frontier analysis | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | German municipalities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Finanzausgleich | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kommunaler Finanzausgleich | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kommunalverwaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bürokratietheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Technische Effizienz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Fiskalillusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftlichkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Deutschland | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | organizational slack | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The Impact of Intergovernmental Grants on Cost Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from German Municipalities | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 571867065 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7361 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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