Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668
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dc.contributor.authorBeschorner, Patrick Frank Ernsten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whetherentry is deterred or accommodated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-083en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordliberalizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpostal servicesen_US
dc.subject.stwPostbeförderungen_US
dc.subject.stwDeregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleEntry Deterrence in Postal Service Marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn556666283en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:7007-

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