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Title:Entry Deterrence in Postal Service Markets PDF Logo
Authors:Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 07-083
Abstract:In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether entry is deterred or accommodated.
postal services
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

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