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dc.contributor.authorSturm, Bodoen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiechmann, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorDannenberg, Astriden_US
dc.contributor.authorVogt, Carstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:06Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24620-
dc.description.abstractWe present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheim-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 07-034 [rev.]en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24598-
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordindividual preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.titleInequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn543282171en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:6088-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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