Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24620
Authors: 
Sturm, Bodo
Riechmann, Thomas
Dannenberg, Astrid
Vogt, Carsten
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 07-034 [rev.]
Abstract: 
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.
Subjects: 
individual preferences
inequity aversion
experimental economics
public goods
JEL: 
H41
C91
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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