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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24611
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| Title: | | Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees  |
| Authors: | | Mihailov, Alexander Ullrich, Katrin |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 07-044 |
| Abstract: | | The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability. |
| Subjects: | | Independence accountability monetary policy fiscal policy expert committees institution design |
| JEL: | | E63 E61 E52 E58 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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