Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24585
Authors: 
Lange, Andreas
Löschel, Andreas
Vogt, Carsten
Ziegler, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 07-025
Abstract: 
This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outcomes. We first advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use of equity. Agents are predicted to push equity principles which benefit them more than other parties, in particular those which are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we then study how participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major parties in the climate negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES model, we find that the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of countries are in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria and thereby lend support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by the participants of our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as Russia, the EU manages to be seen as choosing (self-serving) equity arguments out of fairness concerns and in order to facilitate the negotiations.
Subjects: 
bargaining theory
equity criteria
self-serving bias
climate policy
survey data
JEL: 
H41
D63
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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