Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24568
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dc.contributor.authorHimmler, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:57:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:57:33Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24568-
dc.description.abstractA simple model of decentralised graduation standards is presented. It is shownthat a school whose students are disadvantaged on the labour market applies less demanding standards because such students have less incentives to graduate. The model's predictions are tested using Dutch school-level data. Since students in the Netherlands have to participate both in a central and in a school specific examination, we can identify the grading policy of individual schools. We find that schools which harbour greater shares of disadvantaged students tend to set lower standards. This effect is largest in the branch of secondary schooling preparing for university.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-016en_US
dc.subject.jelI21en_US
dc.subject.jelJ15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordeducationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial statusen_US
dc.subject.keywordschoolsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetherlandsen_US
dc.titleDouble Standards in Educational Standards: Are Disadvantaged Students Being Graded More Leniently?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn527585025en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5504-

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