Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549
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dc.contributor.authorCerquera Dussán, Danielen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:57:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:57:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These inefficiencies are solely due to the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-93en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelO31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetwork externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordInnovationen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Competitionen_US
dc.titleR&D incentives, compatibility and network externalitiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn523076800en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5486-

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