Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549 
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dc.contributor.authorCerquera Dussán, Danielen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:57:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:57:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These inefficiencies are solely due to the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-093en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelD21en
dc.subject.jelO31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetwork externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordInnovationen
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Competitionen
dc.titleR&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn523076800en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5486en

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