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Title:Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity PDF Logo
Authors:Lange, Andreas
Vogt, Carsten
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 01-14
Abstract:This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.
Subjects:international environmental negotiations
cooperation
equity preference
coalition formation
JEL:H41
D63
C7
Q00
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW
ZEW Discussion Papers

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