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| Title: | | Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity  |
| Authors: | | Lange, Andreas Vogt, Carsten |
| Issue Date: | | 2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 01-14 |
| Abstract: | | This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached. |
| Subjects: | | international environmental negotiations cooperation equity preference coalition formation |
| JEL: | | H41 D63 C7 Q00 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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