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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24416
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| Title: | | Management Control and Innovative Activity  |
| Authors: | | Czarnitzki, Dirk Kraft, Kornelius |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 00-68 |
| Abstract: | | This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity. |
| Subjects: | | Innovative Activity Managerial versus Owner-led Firms Incentives Tobit Regression |
| JEL: | | C24 O32 D21 O31 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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