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dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorConrad, Klausen_US
dc.contributor.authorLöschel, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:55:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:55:03Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24392-
dc.description.abstractGermany has committed itself to reducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in 2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. To achieve this goal, the government has recently launched an environmental tax reform which entails a continuous increase in energy taxes in conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut in non-wage labor costs. This policy is supposed to yield a double dividend, reducing both, the problem of global warming and high unemployment rates. In addition to domestic actions, international treaties on climate protection allow for the supplementary use of flexible instruments to exploit cheaper emission reduction possibilities elsewhere. One concrete option for Germany would be to enter joint implementation with developing countries such as India where Germany pays emission reduction abroad rather than meeting its reduction target solely by domestic action. In this paper, we investigate whether an environmental tax reform cum joint implementation (JI) provides employment and overall efficiency gains as compared to an environmental tax reform stand-alone (ETR). We address this question in the framework of a large-scale general equilibrium model for Germany and India where Germany may undertake joint implementation with the Indian electricity sector. Our main finding is that joint implementation offsets adverse effects of carbon emission constraints on the German economy. JI significantly lowers the level of carbon taxes and thus reduces the total costs of abatement as well as negative effects on labor demand. In addition, JI triggers direct investment demand for energy efficient power plants produced in Germany. This provides positive employment effects and additional income for Germany. For India, joint implementation equips its electricity industry with scarce capital goods leading to a more efficient power production with lower electricity prices for the economy and substantial welfare gains.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheim-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 00-45en_US
dc.subject.jelF20en_US
dc.subject.jelD58en_US
dc.subject.jelQ25en_US
dc.subject.jelD24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental tax reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordjoint implementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordproductivity gapsen_US
dc.subject.keywordenergy efficiency improvementen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomputable general equilibrium modelingen_US
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltverträgliche Energiepolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.subject.stwIndienen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.titleCarbon taxes and general joint implementation: an applied general equilibrium analysis for Germany and Indiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn322470528en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5329-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW
ZEW Discussion Papers

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