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dc.contributor.authorFehn, Raineren_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Carsten-Patricken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:14:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:14:32Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2426-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with an institutional bias toward favoring insiders on both markets. Coherent and relatively homogeneous societies, where binding commitments enjoy greater feasability, are more likely to be found in the latter, corporatist equilibrium, whereas fragmented, heterogeneous Anglo-Saxon societies fit better into the former category. These predictions of the model receive considerable support in our cross-country empirical analysis, thus being potentially important for the current debates concerning the reforms of labor markets and of corporate governance systems.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKiel Working Papers 982-
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelK22en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.keywordcorporatismen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor markets-
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governance-
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economy-
dc.subject.keywordshareholder protection-
dc.subject.stwKorporatismusen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwAktienrechten_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwInsider-Outsider-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleThe positive economics of corporatism and corporate governanceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn314117180en_US
dc.identifier.ppn314117180en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW

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