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dc.contributor.authorHeinemann, Friedrichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:50:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:50:29Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24255-
dc.description.abstractWithin the economic profession, it is a widely held view that the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht treaty are arbitrary numbers without economic foundation. Much of this criticism seems to overlook an important aspect - the strategic dimension of the criteria. This paper focuses on one particular question out of this broad strategic complex: How do the criteria change the fiscal bargaining situation on the national level? For this purpose, a bargaining game between a national finance minister and an interest group over budget consolidation is designed. The purpose of this paper is twofold : On the one hand the analysis should contribute to a better understanding of the strategic effects of the fiscal criteria in the pre-EMU period. On the other hand it is to provide insights helpful for the construction of credible and strategically consistent debt limits in the time after the introduction of the Euro.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 98-01en_US
dc.subject.jelH60en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Monetary Unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordConvergence Criteriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordBudget Consolidationen_US
dc.subject.keywordBoundaryen_US
dc.subject.keywordSignallingen_US
dc.subject.keywordConditionalityen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen_US
dc.subject.stwKonvergenzkriterienen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe EMU Consolidation Game - or: Does 3.0 Really Mean 3.0?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn239204085en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5176-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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