Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24210
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dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoschel, Henrikeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoslener, Ulfen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:50:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:50:00Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24210-
dc.description.abstractEnergy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are subject to a diverse set of policies related to climate change. Weanalyse the potential efficiency losses from simultaneous application of emission taxes andemissions trading in qualitative and quantitative terms within a partial equilibrium frameworkfor the EU. It turns out that those firms within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)which at the same time are subject to domestic energy or carbon taxes will abate inefficientlymuch while other firms within the EU ETS will benefit from lower international emissionpermit prices. The same logic disproves the argument that additional national emission taxeswill reduce inefficiencies in abatement supposed to be resulting from allowance (over-)allocation. In essence, unilateral emission taxes within the EU ETS are ecologicallyineffective and subsidise net permit buyers. Thus, all firms that are subject to emissionstrading and any CO2 emission taxes at the same time should be exempt from the latter. Theforegone tax revenue could be generated by auctioning a small fraction of the permits instead.This would be cheaper for the emissions trading sectors as a whole and could be compatibleeven with the tight auctioning restrictions of the EU directive.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-18en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordemission taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordNational Allocation Plansen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwExcess Burdenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleEfficiency Losses from Overlapping Economic Instruments in European Carbon Emissions Regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510225071en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4597-

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