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dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoschel, Henrikeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoslener, Ulfen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:50:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:50:00Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24210-
dc.description.abstractEnergy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are subject to a diverse set of policies related to climate change. We analyse the potential efficiency losses from simultaneous application of emission taxes and emissions trading in qualitative and quantitative terms within a partial equilibrium framework for the EU. It turns out that those firms within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which at the same time are subject to domestic energy or carbon taxes will abate inefficiently much while other firms within the EU ETS will benefit from lower international emission permit prices. The same logic disproves the argument that additional national emission taxes will reduce inefficiencies in abatement supposed to be resulting from allowance (over-) allocation. In essence, unilateral emission taxes within the EU ETS are ecologically ineffective and subsidise net permit buyers. Thus, all firms that are subject to emissions trading and any CO2 emission taxes at the same time should be exempt from the latter. The foregone tax revenue could be generated by auctioning a small fraction of the permits instead. This would be cheaper for the emissions trading sectors as a whole and could be compatible even with the tight auctioning restrictions of the EU directive.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 06-18en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordemission taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordNational Allocation Plansen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwExcess Burdenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleEfficiency Losses from Overlapping Economic Instruments in European Carbon Emissions Regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510225071en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4597-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW
ZEW Discussion Papers

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