Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24195
Authors: 
Anger, Niels
Böhringer, Christoph
Lange, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 06-03
Abstract: 
In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design.
Subjects: 
environmental tax reform
interest groups
common agency
JEL: 
P16
H23
D62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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