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Neuere Version: 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 05-90
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a linked employer-employee data set, this paper analyses the relationship between firm-profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, seem to suppress firm-level rent-sharing. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe? cient of zero. Differenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our profitability measure even point to a negative relationship under centralised contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
Rent-Sharing
Unions
Linked Employer-Employee Data
JEL: 
C23
J51
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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