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dc.contributor.authorBreitscheidel, Jörgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:42Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24183-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the application of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms in environmental regulation and explore the question whether these mechanisms yield strong investment incentives in a market with many firms under Cournot competition. It turns out that the tax/subsidy mechanism with the announcement of the subsidy rate and the tax/subsidy mechanism with the announcement of the tax rate work for an arbitrary number of firms, which means that they yield strong incentives for investing in environmentally friendly technologies. The announcement of the subsidy rate is preferable for solving hold-up problems.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 05-87en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordTaxes and subsidiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSelffinancing mechanismsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEmission controlen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen_US
dc.subject.stwSubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwhold-up problemsen_US
dc.titleSelf-financing Tax/Subsidy Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation with Many Firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn504689347en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4570-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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