Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24176
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorVanberg, Margit A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:37Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24176-
dc.description.abstractThe majority of industrial organizations literature on network externalities looks at firm behaviorunder given market characteristics. The present paper instead asks the question whether thepresence of network externalities can change market characteristics, specifically, whether aninitially large market player can decline cooperation (interconnection) with competing networkoperators and thereby gain a dominant position when network externalities are significant. Thepaper comes to the conclusion that only when a network operator already has network specificmarket power due to the ownership of a monopolistic bottleneck network area, will networkexternalities enable the operator to increase his market dominance. In competitive markets or incontestable natural monopolies, however, network externalities will not lend network specificmarket power to an initially large operator. In these markets, the market process can be expected tosolve the trade-off between ensuring cooperation between competing operators and at the sametime safeguarding competition in product characteristics and quality of service.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-80en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnetwork externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterconnectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwStruktur-Performance-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrieökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwNormungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleNetwork Externalities and Interconnection Incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn504688626en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4563-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
425.32 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.