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dc.contributor.authorTykvová, Terezaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170-
dc.description.abstractSyndication, which is a joint realization of one project/one investment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenon that plays a central role in many financial market segments. Within this paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experienced financiers may partner with either other experienced investors (in order to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilled investors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate that sometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 05-74en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSyndicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordHold-upen_US
dc.subject.keywordReputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLearningen_US
dc.subject.stwProjektfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwWissenstransferen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen_US
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWho Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn502876689en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4557-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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