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dc.contributor.authorRincke, Johannesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:48:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:48:51Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24104-
dc.description.abstractA simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented. Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an old and a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to the old policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governments are either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. An equilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad governments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evaluation. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstick competition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should show spatial correlation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEW Discussion Papers 05-11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwYardstick Competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleYardstick Competition and Policy Innovationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn479723583en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:2901-
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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