Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835
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dc.contributor.authorVoigtländer, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T12:03:43Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-30T12:03:43Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835-
dc.description.abstractIn the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertilitydecisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focusesespecially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker(1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distortsdecisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, theassessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solelyresponsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it iscombined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapiere / Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung |x2004,02en_US
dc.subject.jelD10en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.jelI20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPay-as-you-goen_US
dc.subject.keywordchild-related pensionen_US
dc.subject.keywordquantity and quality of childrenen_US
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Rentenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienleistungsausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Educationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn49523933Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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