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Diskussionspapiere, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835
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| Title: | | A Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education  |
| Authors: | | Voigtländer, Michael |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Diskussionspapiere / Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung 2004,02 |
| Abstract: | | In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored. |
| Subjects: | | Pay-as-you-go child-related pension quantity and quality of children |
| JEL: | | D10 H55 I20 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Diskussionspapiere, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung
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