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Title:A Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education PDF Logo
Authors:Voigtländer, Michael
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Diskussionspapiere / Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung 2004,02
Abstract:In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.
Subjects:Pay-as-you-go
child-related pension
quantity and quality of children
JEL:D10
H55
I20
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Diskussionspapiere, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung

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